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Introduction
This White Paper is the final product of a project called 
“Public consultations on reforming local government in 
Ukraine and public awareness campaign–Phase 2” be-
ing carried out by the Center for Ukrainian Reform Edu-
cation (CURE) and the International Centre for Policy 
Studies (ICPS). This report outlines key problems in lo-
cal government today, describes reform measures pro-
posed to resolve them, and summarizes the positions of 
various interest groups regarding current problems and 
the suggested pathways to a solution.
In the first phase of this project, ICPS and CURE held 
public hearings in seven oblasts of Ukraine over Novem-
ber–December 2007, where a Green Paper on Local 
Government Reform was the basis for discussion. This 
analytical document discussed the current problems 
with the system of local government and how to handle 
them.
This report is based largely on the original Green Paper 
prepared during the first phase of this project. Other ana-
lytical materials prepared by ICPS were also used in pre-
paring this report: a Green Paper on public administra-
tion reform in Ukraine, which was drafted in 2006 by the 
National Council on Public Administration and Local 
Government and the Center for Legal Reform with the 
support of ICPS under the “Public consultations on 
public administration reform” project, and the final re-
port from the “Public consultations and awareness cam-
paign on political reform in Ukraine,” which was also 
carried out by CURE and ICPS during 2007.
introduction
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The overall structure of this report is similar to that of 
the original Green Paper, which underwent public dis-
cussion. Each chapter has been considerably expanded 
now, based on our analysis of the positions of various 
stakeholder groups and materials that they presented 
during the consultations.
The key difference between this Paper and the Green 
Paper is that it summarizes the reactions of stakeholders 
to the original contents. The current report makes it 
clear how changes to local administration need to be un-
dertaken in order to succeed and indicates which of the 
proposed changes are a priority for regional stakehold-
ers. Based on the information gathered at the hearings, 
many propositions from the Green Paper have been ex-
panded and detailed.
This report can also be useful for international donor or-
ganizations that support the activities of community or-
ganizations in the regions. It provides an explanation for 
which problems in local polity are seen as core by re-
gional representatives themselves and which ways of re-
solving them these individuals propose.
In addition to a discussion of the Green Paper, a report 
by Györgyi Nyikos, the Hungarian expert in local gov-
ernment, was presented during the second round of pub-
lic consultations. With the help of this report, the par-
ticipating Ukrainian stakeholders were able to look at 
issues of local government from a cross-national per-
spective. This report is presented here as a separate at-
tachment.
The participants in this project express their thanks to 
the Westminster Foundation for Democracy for its fi-
nancial support of the implementation of this project.
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1.	 Key	problems		
in	local	governing
The consultations we held generally confirmed the rea-
lity of the problems in the work of local governments 
that had been raised in the Green Paper. Still, stakehold-
ers who participated in the discussions rated the impor-
tance of these problems quite differently. All regional 
representatives, without exception, paid the most atten-
tion during these discussions, not to the problem of in-
accessible or low-quality public services provided at the 
local level, but to the enormous gap between what local 
governments did and what really mattered to local vo-
ters—and to the lack of accountability before the com-
munity. This last cluster of problems was where the most 
adjustments and additions came from stakeholders at 
the public hearings.
1.1.	Inaccessible,	poor	quality	public	services
Local governments are supposed to provide basic social 
and administrative services: pre-school, primary, secon-
dary and tech-voc education; preventive medicine and 
primary and secondary healthcare; keeping the public 
peace; the organization of residential service delivery, 
public transit, and so on. Today, only cities are capable 
of carrying out all these functions. Most rural communi-
ties and even many towns lack the financial and human 
resources to provide the entire range of public services of 
the necessary quality and quantity.
Rural communities 
can’t provide needed 
public services
key problems in local governing
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The result is that most people are deprived of the right to 
good quality public services and the human development 
gap among regions is considerable.
This issue was raised least of all by stakeholders at 
the public hearings. Most likely this is because the 
consultations took place in oblast centers, where this 
problem is not as serious. Representatives of rural, 
county and small town governments were noticeably 
absent at these hearings.
1.2.	 Government	actions	and	voter	concerns:	
Mind	the	gap
Being neither accountable to nor overseen by their con-
stituencies, local governments, and especially local state 
administrations, yet dependent on the central govern-
ment, local administrations are driven less by the con-
cerns and needs of the local community than by their 
own interests or those of the central government. The 
Budget process itself and the top-down nature of budget 
planning and execution objectively make it impossible 
to take the interests of voters into account in the activi-
ties of local governments.
To this day, there are no workable mechanisms for voters 
to make clear their concerns and to ensure that these are 
taken into account in the work of the local government. 
Proportional elections to city, county and oblast coun-
cils have increased the “disconnect” between deputies 
and their constituents—and the interests of those con-
stituents. As representatives of various parties in local 
councils, deputies are often less engaged in promoting 
the concerns of the residents of their communities than 
in the ideological struggle for power.
Priorities in funding local needs depend less on the will 
of local voters than on politicians and officials in Kyiv. 
As a consequence, there is little objective need for local 
representatives of local governments to be open about 
their work before the representatives of local communi-
Voter concerns 
do not drive local 
governments
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ties or to consider voter interests in carrying out their 
activities.
Essentially, local governments and local executive bod-
ies are unsupervised and unaccountable in the exercise 
of their powers. Neither the state nor communities have 
any working mechanisms for overseeing the work of lo-
cal governments. This is especially obvious when it 
comes to handling land issues and planning the con-
struction and development of infrastructure in cities, 
towns and villages.
According to stakeholders at the consultations, this is 
one of the key issues at the local level. They consi­
dered the actions of both local governments and state 
bodies equally unaccountable and inappropriate in 
relation to the activity of local communities. As a 
rule, the biggest complaints in this direction were 
about the ineffective management of land, water, 
forest and mineral resources. At the basic level, and 
especially if the community was on the outskirts of a 
major city, local governments frequently abuse the 
right to transfer arable plots of land at no cost to pri­
vate ownership. Governments also ineffectively man­
age mineral, forest and water resources that are un­
der their control. These are often a means for public 
officials to take rents, which is neither in the state’s 
interests nor in the local community’s.
Participating stakeholders also noted the lack of 
workable mechanisms—or of any mechanisms at 
all—to ensure that local governments did not operate 
outside the control of the local community or appro­
priate bodies.
Voters have no means 
to oversee local 
governments
key problems in local governing
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1.3.	 Local	economies—slow	or	no-go;	
regional	development—uneven
State and local budget policy makes local development 
impossible today. Most communities do not even have 
development budgets, and all resources are directed at 
covering day-to-day needs.
The unitary model of government in Ukraine today ex-
pects public services to be delivered at the same level 
across all the country’s territories. Yet, economic deve-
lopment varies greatly from region to region. As a result, 
there is a strong need for highly centralized public fi-
nancing. To ensure the necessary level of public services 
to a given population, cashflow first has to be concen-
trated in the State Budget of Ukraine and then, based on 
a distribution formula, handed out to the regions through 
equalization transfers. In this kind of situation, local 
governments are effectively deprived of any means to 
strategically plan local development.
The problem is that the existing distribution mechanisms 
do not actually provide the necessary leveling in public 
service delivery. Today, only a few regions—more accu-
rately, a few major cities—more-or-less provide the full 
range of public services guaranteed by law. Most of the 
rest of the regions have trouble even providing those ser-
vices needed to just survive.
In addition, the current mechanisms for forming and 
executing local budgets, where local revenues constitute 
an extremely tiny share, provide little incentive for local 
governments to develop their local economies. Low le-
vels of local revenues mean that local governments can-
not provide funding to support even the development of 
local infrastructure. Migration to faster-growing regions 
in search of a better standard of living causes business 
activity and jobs to decline, which leads to even less 
growth in the tax base and, in the final analysis, to an 
even lower share of local revenues in the local budget.
Mechanisms for 
distributing resources 
are unbalanced
	 11
Stakeholders were generally in agreement that this is 
a problem, providing specific examples in support of 
this.
1..	 State	and	local	governments:	
Uncoordinated	and	even	conflicting
A slew of conflicts between the state government and lo-
cal governments are written into legislation. Up to 80% 
of the powers of local governments are duplicated by the 
powers of local state administrations. On one hand, lo-
cal state administrations are formed at the top; on the 
other, they have been delegated by law to function as the 
executive bodies of the relevant councils.
Indeed, the political status of local state administrators 
makes it very difficult to be objective in their work and is 
yet another source of conflict with local councils, espe-
cially those formed on a proportional basis.
Participating stakeholders generally agreed that this 
is an ongoing problem. In their opinion, this situa­
tion increases the level of corruption and dependence 
of the judiciary branch, which cannot be an inde­
pendent arbitrator in cases involving local state bod­
ies and local governments.
The powers of local 
government and 
state administrations 
overlap
key problems in local governing
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2.	 The	roots	of	these	
problems
2.1.	 The	lowest	level	of	government	cannot	
carry	out	the	necessary	functions
The administrative-territorial system inherited from the 
USSR in most cases ensures neither a proper resource 
base for territorial communities to govern themselves, 
especially rural ones, nor does it take into account im-
pact of the population of these communities and their 
demographic profile on the type and quantity of public 
services that need to be provided to local residents.
Ukraine’s current administrative system is typified by a 
high level of centralization of functions and concentra-
tion of resources at the county and oblast levels. The 
relative size of local budgets in the Consolidated State 
Budget is 40%, while that of oblast budgets in total local 
budgets is 38%; the relative size of oblast-level munici-
pal budgets is 47%, while that of county budgets is 15%. 
The relative size of the budgets of villages, towns and 
county-level towns in the consolidated county budget is 
15-20%. This means that three times more funds are de-
liberately allocated to the budgets of oblast-level towns 
than to county budgets, although more than 60% of the 
population of Ukraine lives in villages, towns and small 
cities.
The administrative 
structure does not 
ensure resources for 
communities 
 to develop
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In addition, there is an enormous gap in the economic 
and demographic profiles of communities and counties, 
with populations ranging from as little as 15,000 inhabi-
tants—some counties of Chernihiv Oblast—up to 
130,000—Derhachivskiy County in Kharkiv Oblast. 
This results in objective reasons for the unequal provi-
sion of public services to the local population.
The current situation actually hampers the development 
of proper local government in villages, towns and coun-
ty-level cities.
In many medium-sized and large cities, local govern-
ments are quite capable of providing their residents with 
the whole range of necessary services without involving 
local governments at the oblast level or local state ad-
ministrations. But due to the way legislation has been 
drawn up, they do not actually have the authority to do 
so. Indeed, the residents of large cities have to apply for 
certain services to oblast administrations and, even 
worse, to state bodies that are neither accountable to nor 
supervised by the community.
Still, the majority of communities cannot provide the 
full range of public services, not due to legal restrictions, 
but for lack of resources—financial, human and so on.
The actual extent of community government remains 
unclear to this day. Flaws in the legislation dealing with 
this limit the jurisdiction of community government 
bodies to the limits of their populated areas, leaving the 
status of lands adjacent to each community to be deci-
ded at the county level by state administrations.
Typically, participating stakeholders agreed only 
partly with the supposed roots of local government 
problems. Most of them agreed with such points as 
the centralized allocation of financial resources, the 
violation of the jurisdiction of local government, and 
ineffective legislative restrictions.
The type and 
population of 
communities and 
counties varies 
excessively
Local government is 
not universal
the roots of these problems
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On the other hand, participating stakeholders did 
not generally consider major differences in the sizes 
of counties or overly small populations in territorial 
units as something that seriously hinders the work of 
local governments or reduces the likelihood that the 
local population will receive quality public services.
Firstly, stakeholders tended to appeal to the histori­
cal, cultural, religious and ethnic aspects of various 
regions as determining the difference in the popula­
tions of oblasts, counties and territorial units. Sec­
ondly, most stakeholders were convinced that in the 
majority of cases the lowest level of local government 
would be quite capable of performing its functions if 
all the other problems in the system of local govern­
ment system were solved: ensuring financial inde­
pendence, more effective property and land manage­
ment, and so on.
On the other hand, the idea was sometimes voiced at 
these consultations that, should territorial reform be 
undertaken in Ukraine, it would be necessary to 
harmonize the domestic system with European stan­
dards. This would make it possible to use EU struc­
tural funds effectively in the future. Participating 
stakeholders also raised clear examples of how un­
able many local governments were to function, at the 
lowest level. For example, some 15% of village coun­
cils lack their own premises in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, 
while 25% of those who do have no heating.
2.2.	 The	division	of	power	at	all	levels	is	
unclear	and	irrational
According to the Constitution, there are two centers of 
power at oblast and county levels: an appointed state ad-
ministration and an elected council. This immediately 
establishes a kind of competition between the two bodies 
and is frequently the cause of conflicts in the process of 
making decisions regarding territorial development.
County and 
community differences 
are historic
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Fully 80% of the powers vested in local governments by 
the Law “On local government in Ukraine” are also 
vested in local state administrations by the Law “On the 
local state administrations.” That is, there is no clear di-
vision of powers between local governments and local 
state administrations. The practice of village, town and 
city councils delegating powers to their oblast and coun-
ty councils, which means to council executive bodies in 
the form of local state administrations, should clearly be 
the exception rather than the rule. Because this practice 
is widespread, it offers opportunities for the abuse of 
public funds and the evasion of accountability on the 
part of local state administrations. It also makes local 
governments dependent on state institutions at all lev-
els.
Local government legislation also fails to clearly divide 
powers, duties and responsibilities among different le-
vels of local government—communities, counties and 
oblasts. Some aspects in this area are regulated by the 
Budget Code. However, the Code only designates spend-
ing powers and establishes the right to determine the 
volume of transfers from the State Budget to oblasts, 
counties and oblast-level cities. As a result, the regula-
tion of relations between oblast and county levels or 
oblast-level cities depends very much on the actions of 
specific officials and varies from region to region. This is 
particularly true of the division of power between oblasts 
and oblast capitals.
This issue is particularly important for specific munici-
pal administrative territorial units (ATUs) that “con-
tain” other ATUs, that is, on whose territories other 
ATUs operate without forming a single community with 
the city. Indeed, they operate as independent local go-
vernments. This is true of 64 oblast-level cities, on whose 
territories 202 other ATUs function—villages, towns and 
so on. This muddied power structure leads to chaos in 
the distribution of resources to exercise powers, which 
offers fertile ground for permanent conflict.
Different levels  
of local government 
also overlap  
as to powers
Sometimes several 
administrative units 
operate within a 
single territory
Similar powers are 
vested in both local 
governments and state 
administrations
the roots of these problems
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Participating stakeholders agreed that the confused 
division of powers is a major cause of problems in 
Ukraine’s system of local government. Some were 
also of the opinion that the consequences of this 
problem are much more serious. The domination of 
state authorities in local affairs tends to discredit the 
institution of local government: local deputies are of­
ten helpless to resolve problems in their communities 
and the result is that voter confidence in them is low. 
The average person sees few benefits from this kind 
of local government.
2.3.	Local	governments	are	fiscally	hobbled
2.3.1.	 Insufficient	sources	of	revenue		
for	local	governments
The need to centralize public funding in order to provide 
public services of equal quality results in an insufficient 
financial base among local governments and their con-
sequent dependence on State Budget transfers.
In general, local government revenues constitute a very 
small part of local budgets—less than 10% of total in-
come. In addition, some local taxes and fees are difficult 
to administrate, so local offices of the State Tax Admin-
istration are actually not interested in collecting these 
taxes and fees. This reduces the enforcement of tax pay-
ments.
Ukraine still has no property tax, which is a major source 
of revenue for local budgets in many countries and can 
guarantee their fiscal viability. In addition, the current 
procedure for distributing revenues from state taxes and 
fees that are in excess of the fiscal norms set by the State 
Budget Law does not encourage the local governments 
even in cities with solid fiscal capacity to do something 
to increase such revenues. Current legislation provides 
no incentives for local governments to promote local 
business development that might, in turn, generate new 
jobs. Possibly the only exception is small and micro en-
There is no 
 property tax
Local revenues 
constitute less than 
10% of local budgets
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terprises that operate under a simplified taxation sys-
tem.
2.3.2.	 Public	funds	do	not	cover		
the	state’s	fiscal	obligations
The scope of local governments powers is defined by law. 
Money to fund the exercise of the powers delegated to 
local governments are allocated by the Verkhovna Rada 
every year during the planning and adoption of the State 
Budget for the following year. However, in deciding the 
ultimate volume of transfers to local budgets, VR depu-
ties do not take into account either the financial state of 
local governments or the range of powers delegated to 
them. Consequently, the transfers are not always enough 
to fully finance the delegated powers.
Spending on the exercise of delegated powers amounts 
to 90% or more of local budget expenditures. A major 
part of this spending, in turn, is to cover the payrolls of 
public institutions. However, funds allocated as transfers 
from the State Budget are sometimes insufficient to even 
pay these salaries in full.
Cities that have substantial revenues of their own can 
pay for their own capital and current spending, although 
they could use these funds to develop local infrastruc-
ture, such as improvements and social and economic 
development, instead.
The central government establishes breaks and holidays 
related to local taxes and fees without paying the neces-
sary compensation to local governments. In addition, 
new laws often add new public duties to local govern-
ment plates without matching financial support.
2.3.3.	 Lack	public	service	standards		
and	costing	methodology
To a large extent, this underfunding of real needs at the 
local level is caused by problems with costing these 
needs. The basis of any cost evaluation should be the 
state social standards and norms that came into force 
The volume 
of transfers is 
inadequate to fund 
delegated powers
Local government 
services have not been 
costed
the roots of these problems
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with the Law “On state social standards and social gua-
rantees.” Still, despite numerous calls for enforcement 
on the part of the Verkhovna Rada, many social stan-
dards and norms still have not been developed by the 
Cabinet of Ministers, although the Law itself came into 
force more than five years ago. The old social standards 
and norms are fragmented into small elements whose 
sum does not cover the whole range of public services 
and whose indicators are often outdated. These factors 
make the old standards and norms unacceptable for cal-
culation, which makes it impossible to come up with a 
correct assessment of expenditures for real service 
needs.
2.3.4.	 The	mechanism	for	distributing	subsidies		
to	local	governments	is	ineffective
According to the Budget Code and the Law “On the 
regulation of budget transfers between county budgets 
and the budgets of county seats, villages, towns and their 
associations,” equalization transfers from the State Bud-
get are planned only to the county budget level. Further 
distribution among county, village, town and county seat 
budgets is actually handled by local state administrations 
and approved by county councils.
This often leads to abuse on the part of county officials 
in terms of how fairly equalization transfers are distribu-
ted among the communities in the county. In effect, this 
is the traditional soviet “nested doll” budget system and 
it keeps local governments from becoming bodies that 
can make independent decision in support of local de-
velopment.
Only state- or oblast-level cities, which have direct ties 
to the State Budget and the Ministry of Finance, have 
the real rights associated with fiscal independence. The 
rest of the country’s basic self-governing ATUs—villa-
ges, towns and cities—do not have the necessary finan-
cial resources to provide the full range of public services, 
from public, state, housing and utilities, to social and 
cultural services.
State subsidies at 
the county level are 
handled by local 
administrations
Only cities designated 
as state or oblast 
level are fiscally 
independent
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By encouraging a “handout” mentality towards the State 
Budget, the equalization transfer mechanism established 
by Ukraine’s Budget Code provides little incentive for 
communities, especially smaller cities, towns and villa-
ges, to generate their own revenues. On the other hand, 
taking those revenues that exceed “fiscal capacity norms” 
for expenditures away from the municipal budgets of 
large and medium-sized cities offsets any efforts on the 
part of “donor” communities to promote business, em-
ployment and increased personal incomes. Ukraine’s 
donor communities are mostly those cities with a popu-
lation of over 500,000, cities with ports, railway hubs, 
major export-oriented enterprises, or atomic energy sta-
tions, that is, those cities whose strong economic base 
was established under the Soviet Union.
The question of fiscal independence for local go­
vernments was one of the most burning issues raised 
at these consultations. Participating stakeholders 
largely agreed that local governments needed to have 
their own revenue bases. However, they proposed 
quite a range of different approaches to expanding 
these sources.
Some stakeholders expressed doubts that property 
and land taxes could become a major, stable revenue 
source for local budgets in the first years after they 
were introduced. Still, there needs to be some move­
ment in the direction of collecting such taxes. Other 
issues also need to be dealt with: expanding the juris­
diction of local governments to the areas adjacent to 
communities, finding qualified potential owners for 
farmland, and so on. Otherwise, property and land 
taxes are unlikely to become a significant source of 
local budget revenues.
Some participating stakeholders suggested contro­
versial proposals, such as increasing local govern­
ment revenues by better managing community re­
sources for profit, if state management of resources 
such as minerals (granite, sand, mineral water), fo­
rests and water is ineffective.
Local communities 
have little incentive 
to establish their own 
revenue base
A property tax should 
be instituted along 
with other measures
the roots of these problems
20	 reforming local government in ukraine
The issue of standardizing public services caused 
considerable controversy as well. While recognizing 
the urgency of the problem, participating stakehold­
ers expressed many reservations as to what mecha­
nisms and methods should be used in calculating 
these standards.
2..	 Use	of	money,	property	and	resources		
is	inefficient	and	inappropriate
A system for determining the effectiveness and produc-
tivity of public spending has not been worked out, 
whether at the State Budget level or at the local budget 
level. A combination of the fact that it is impossible cur-
rently to finance all the commitments taken on by the 
central and local governments and the fact that commu-
nities have no leverage over local state administrations 
results in a free-wheeling approach to forming local 
budgets. Other than secured items, such as payroll for 
public employees, the financing of specific expenditures 
depends largely on what officials in local state adminis-
trations feel like doing.
The existing procedure for preparing budget request 
based on the previous year’s spending figures does not 
reflect the impact of these expenditures on the volume 
and quality of services provided to the local population. 
This leads to ineffective planning and inefficient use of 
public funds.
The absence of “management by objectives” planning 
and scheduled audits that make it possible to monitor 
the effective use of funds, and the effective absence of 
external controls including public fiscal oversight of the 
use of local budget monies are further reasons for the 
ineffective use of already limited financial resources.
The existing network of public entities does not reflect 
the needs of Ukrainian society today. On one hand, some 
bodies and institutions that receive the public and pro-
vide with specific services do not even have proper prem-
ises. On the other, other budget institutions rent out their 
There is no system for 
evaluating the impact 
of expenditures
There’s no effective 
internal or external 
budget oversight
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premises to commercial entities or hang on to premises 
they have no use for, thus placing extra strain on local or 
State Budgets.
Currently, there are also no working mechanisms for 
communities to join forces on a contractual basis in or-
der to undertake and finance specific functions together. 
This prevents any optimization of the network of public 
institutions and organizations. For example, when the 
law fails to provide a simple mechanism for funding a 
single institution, say, a school or clinic, out of several 
local budgets, the network of these institutions cannot 
be improved by increasing the efficiency of the local gov-
ernment’s use of available resources. There are other le-
gal barriers to optimizing public institutions, as well. Ac-
cording to Part 3 of Art. 49 of the Constitution of 
Ukraine, for instance, the current network of healthcare 
facilities can not be reduced.
Laws regulating the status of community property and 
the exercise of delegated powers need improving. The 
distribution of municipal and state lands has not been 
completed. Consequently, the material resources avail-
able to local governments are being used extremely inef-
fectively. This is particularly true of land belonging to 
underdeveloped communities that border on major eco-
nomic and industrial centers, as well as municipal land 
and property in urban areas.
The main problem, according to most participating 
stakeholders, is the inefficient use of resources due to 
corruption in government and state authorities. As a 
result, local governments often fritter away their most 
valuable resource—land. Similarly, state bodies are 
very ineffective at managing forest, water and min­
eral resources, squandering them without any benefit 
to the state or local communities.
Ultimately, the most likely solution to the problem of 
inefficient budget management, in the view of com­
munity organizations that attended the hearings, 
would be to introduce external public oversight over 
its use. They made it clear they had little faith in the 
The network of 
public institutions is 
inefficient
Local governments 
make poor use of 
available resources
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possibility of proper internal mechanisms for con­
trolling budget spending and increasing its effective­
ness, such as budget management by objectives, 
scheduled audits, and so on.
2..	 Voters	have	no	input	into	legislation		
to	support	local	development
Effective procedures and mechanisms for coordinating 
between central and local governments are lacking when 
it comes to policy decisions that affect the interests of 
local governments. According to the Constitution, local 
governments, unlike the executive and legislative branch, 
are not empowered to legislate. Moreover, local govern-
ment representatives may not appeal to the Constitu-
tional Court of Ukraine, even on matters within their 
competence.
At the state level, there is no institution that might rep-
resent the interests of local governments and have veto 
powers over the drafting and adoption of bills that violate 
its rights and eliminate state guarantees. The Secretariat 
of the President, the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Min-
isters, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Justice, 
the Ministry of Finance, and so on, all have departments 
at the level of administrative sections—at MinFin it is an 
actual department—, that handle local government is-
sues.
Because of this, local government interests are poorly 
represented and not heard when legislation regulating 
local government activities is being drafted.
Participating stakeholders considered this problem 
in the broader context of a lack of proper contact be­
tween voters and their elected representatives and 
the resulting tendency to ignore the regions and the 
opinions of regional leaders in the legislative process. 
Indeed, the main political forces in the Rada show 
little interest in taking local government problems se­
riously.
Local governments 
have no impact on 
decisions made in Kyiv
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According to participating stakeholders, the central 
government is not interested in large­scale reform of 
local government or in the re­distribution of powers 
and resources in favor of the regions and communi­
ties. This means that mechanisms must be estab­
lished that would allow local reform activists to lobby 
such changes in Kyiv.
2..	 There	are	not	enough	professionals	at	
the	local	level
One major factor underlying current problems in local 
government in Ukraine is also the lack of professionals, 
especially in local governments. According to the Main 
Administration of the Civil Service, only 61.5% of the 
country’s 92,000 local government officials have com-
pleted a Master’s degree, which is considered a proper 
post-secondary education in Ukraine. In 2005, only 
11.6% of municipal officials undertook professional de-
velopment courses, while nearly 240,000 local council 
deputies for all intents and purposes received no targeted 
courses in local government. This means that local offi-
cials sometimes not only do not know how to resolve 
specific problems, but are often not entirely aware of the 
scope of rights and powers that the state and the law as-
sign to different levels of local government.
This problem has become even more pressing since the 
2006 elections, when nearly 80% of elected deputies at 
all council levels were newcomers. Of 172 elected oblast-
level municipal mayors, only 75 were incumbents. This 
means that in about 59% of Ukraine’s cities, where more 
than 50% of the population live, mayors were elected for 
the first time. Needless to say, these positions were oc-
cupied by people for whom municipal government was a 
completely new sphere.
Another unresolved problem is depoliticizing the civil 
service at the local level. When bureaucratic positions 
are politicized, enormous turnover of staff results at the 
local level after any election. The newly-elected head of 
Local governments 
lack professional staff
Mayors and deputies 
need professional 
development
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a city, town or village often fires many qualified workers 
in the executive, who were forced to campaign on behalf 
of the predecessor, and then hires new, less qualified 
workers.
In addition, there is an urgent need to overhaul the sys-
tem for training state and especially municipal officials 
because it does not satisfy needs of the country or the 
regions. The current system is oriented mostly towards 
academic teaching and its curriculum is not aimed at the 
professional development of individuals who are in mid-
career. It is also quite limited in terms of “throughput.” 
According to the Main Administration of the Civil Ser-
vice, at the current rate, it will take the current system 
240 years to train highly qualified public servants and lo-
cal government officials, as there are some 92,000 offi-
cials working in local government in Ukraine today.
As to training for local council deputies, there is no such 
system at the state level. In this situation, it makes sense 
that the primary training should be organized by politi-
cal parties when they begin to form their election lists.
The topic of the lack of professionals among deputies 
and local government officials led to the most heated 
debate at these consultations. Stakeholders were 
quick to point out the lack of professionalism among 
deputies on local councils, which are elected on a 
proportional basis.
Deputies not only lack knowledge of the local go­
vernment system but they are also reluctant to bridge 
any gaps in their knowledge. They do not deem this 
necessary because many of them run for local coun­
cil only to lobby their own business interests. Even 
with training, teaching materials and opportunities 
to attend related courses, deputies often ignore any 
resources. For example, according to a survey of 
deputies at different levels published by one of the 
NGOs at the hearings in Dnipropetrovsk, of 127 de­
puties polled in the oblast, only two knew what was in 
the Law “On local government.”
The system 
 for training municipal 
public servants needs 
to be modernized
There is no system 
for training local 
deputies
Deputies show little 
interest in becoming 
more professional
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Needless to say, local councils cannot even effec­
tively exercise the powers they have, let alone lobby 
for further local government reform.
Clearly, the main “gatekeepers” in the selection of 
more professional deputies to local councils should 
be the political parties that form election lists. Still, 
without public pressure and changes to the electoral 
system, the process of improving the quality of elect­
ed representatives will be far too slow and ineffec­
tive.
Another aspect discussed by participating stakehold­
ers was fact that state bodies are unprepared to sup­
port or fund local initiatives to provide training for 
local officials or deputies. For instance, participants 
from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast commented on certain 
restrictions on public funding for training local depu­
ties: to run a course, attendees have to be included in 
the civil service reserve list. Still, there are some pos­
itive examples of state officials supporting such train­
ing programs, such as in Zhytomyr Oblast.
2..	 The	system	for	local	elections	is	flawed
Often local governments do not represent voter interests 
based on their composition. With county and oblast 
councils elected on a proportional basis, many commu-
nities are not represented at all while oblast or county 
centers are over-represented, sometimes controlling as 
much as 80% of an oblast council.
Proportional elections to municipal and oblast councils 
has led to a situation where these bodies often represent 
party interests, but not the interests of their electorates. 
This leads to hyper-politicization on these councils.
The majority of participating stakeholders agreed 
that this was a problem. They considered the flawed 
election system the main factor that had reduced the 
professionalism of elected officials and led to uncon­
structive confrontations on local councils. However, 
The state does not 
support a system for 
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Territorial 
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the discussion of how to resolve this problem provid­
ed no consensus at the local level as to the direction 
the local council election system should evolve in.
2..	 Locals	have	no	means	to	participate	in	
and	monitor	their	governments
Voter involvement in the making of key decisions de-
pends largely on subjective factors and is not regulated 
by law. There is no legislation on local referenda that re-
flects modern conditions.
At the root of the low quality of administrative services is 
the fact most such services are the responsibility of exe-
cutive bodies whose officials do not feel accountable to 
or overseen by the local community and who are not 
subject to the oversight of local governments. The cen-
tralization of power, the lack of proper feedback between 
local governments and their constituencies, insufficient 
state attention to the needs and interests of local govern-
ments have all led to a situation where local governments 
exercise their powers in a legal vacuum and without any 
oversight.
According to participating stakeholders, the compo­
nents of this problem include the inefficiency of 
mechanisms like removing a deputy, voting non­
confidence in a local state administration head by 
the relevant council, assigning deputies to specific 
territories, activity reporting by deputies, and hold­
ing public consultations.
Another component of the problem is the fact that lo­
cal governments and local state administrations ac­
tually hinder public access to necessary information, 
such as regulations, resolutions, statutes and so on. 
The failure to reform the judiciary branch is another 
part of this problem, as it prevents ordinary people 
from effectively challenging specific actions by local 
governments or local state administrations. The 
problem of rule of law in Ukraine keeps Ukrainians 
from effectively controlling their governments.
There is currently no 
real link between local 
governments and their 
constituencies
Mechanisms to hold 
deputies accountable 
or remove them are 
ineffective
Local officials 
actually impede public 
access to necessary 
information
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Stakeholders pointed out that local councils were not 
always in a position to control executive committees. 
Current norms restrict such opportunities, that is, 
elected representatives cannot be members of an ex­
ecutive committee and committee members are no­
minated by the mayor and rubber­stamped by the 
council.
Some stakeholders saw this lack of control over poli­
ticians by voters as the result of the passivity of voters 
themselves, who do not understand nature of local 
government and are not interested in playing an ac­
tive role in local affairs.
2..	 Mechanisms	to	ensure	consistent	
nationwide	policy	are	ineffective
Local state administrations are supposed to ensure con-
sistent state policy across the country. Because of the 
different ways they are formed and overlapping powers, 
city, county and oblast councils are often in conflict with 
both the heads of local state administrations and the 
central government. On one hand, the quasi-political 
status of the head of a local state administration encou-
rages confrontation with the local council if the latter 
has a majority made of parties in opposition to the cen-
tral government or the President. On the other, the 
grounds for calling a vote of non-confidence in the head 
of a local state administration are not specified any-
where, which leads to free-wheeling decisions by local 
councils or to excessive “flexibility” on the part of local 
state administrators.
Then again, the central government does not have any 
leverage over local councils even if they are in violation 
of the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine. The mecha-
nism for calling pre-term elections to local councils by 
Verkhovna Rada that is currently on the books is not very 
effective—something that is confirmed by the fact that 
this provision has not once been applied in nine years. 
The only mechanism for settling such conflicts remains 
The central 
government does not 
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the court system. But even in this case, the personal lia-
bility of individual local deputies for illegal decisions 
made by their councils is unclear.
Participating stakeholders did not pay much atten­
tion to this problem, possibly because it concerns the 
central government more than local ones.
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3.	 Suggested	steps	for	
reform
The stakeholders participating in these public hearings 
offered the most comments, reservations and proposals 
on the priority of changes and on specific proposals pre-
sented in the Green Paper on local government re-
form.”
In general, regional stakeholders shifted the main em-
phasis from large-scale changes like administrative-ter-
ritorial reform, budget reform and so on, to specific 
smaller-scale changes that make a small but specific 
contribution to ameliorating the situation.
According to participating stakeholders, it is possible for 
local government to evolve on the basis of the existing 
Constitution by adopting appropriate legislation. They 
said that the potential for local government development 
afforded by the Constitution and current laws, despite 
their many flaws, was not being fully exploited by local 
governments for a number of objective and subjective 
reasons. Their proposals were mostly limited to concrete 
recommendations as to what requirements should be 
changed to eliminate these factors.
The idea of administrative-territorial reform did not find 
support at these public hearings. Reaction to the idea of 
changing the territorial system and setting up adminis-
trative-territorial units (ATUs) with a “scientifically vi-
able minimal population” was especially negative. Par-
ticipating stakeholders opposed this proposition on the 
basis of historical, religious and ethnic regional charac-
suggested steps for reform
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teristics, which they felt should be taken into account 
when planning such reform.
Most of the other proposals in the Green Paper were 
generally approved. Some of them were concretized, 
added to and clarified.
3.1.	 Options	for	local	government		
and	ATU	systems
Option	1.	 Leave	current	administrative-	
	 	 territorial	system	and	division		
	 	 of	powers	among	levels	of		
	 	 government	(status	quo)
This option keeps the current public administration sys-
tem at the local level and the existing division of powers, 
responsibilities and resources.
Pros Cons
The	service	infrastructure	
will	remain	familiar	to	the	
public.	Local	officials	will	
carry	out	their	customary	
duties	at	their	posts.
All	the	noted	disadvantages	of	
the	existing	system	will	remain,	
which	will	hinder	serious	
improvement	in	public	service	
quality.
Option	2.	 Re-distribution	of	powers	and		
	 	 responsibilities	without	enlarging		
	 	 or	consolidating	communities.
This option presupposes that:
those functions that the lowest level of government—
primarily this concerns rural areas—cannot under-
take to a level that can ensure effective performance 
will be transferred;
communities that have the capacity will be ceded 
more public responsibilities, powers and financial 
opportunities.
Thus, for example, in villages where the councils cannot 
effectively run the school system, this function will be 
transferred to the county level. County education de-
•
•
Option 1: Leave things 
as they are—including 
problems
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partments, which are accountable to the county admin-
istration head—or county council once executive com-
mittees are established—will run the entire school system 
in that county.
Under this option, services will not be remote from con-
sumers because they will be provided through the exist-
ing network of budget institutions, such as through the 
existing school system. However, administrative func-
tions such as financial, HR, property, and school bus 
administration, will be centralized at the county level. 
The powers of large village councils will include only 
those that such councils can actually carry out, such as 
land management, garbage treatment and landscaping.
Pros Cons
County-level	administra-
tion	will	offer	economies	
of	scale	for	social	net-
works	(schools,	medical	
facilities).
A	certain	quality	of	public	
services	will	be	guaran-
teeable.
Cities,	especially	big	ones,	
will	be	able	to	indepen-
dently	provide	a	greater	
range	of	public	services	
on	their	own	judgment.
Public	services	in	rural	counties	
will	be	predominantly	adminis-
trated	centrally.
The	location	of	specific	services	
will	tend	to	be	remote	from	the	
residences	and	businesses	of	
those	needing	the	services.
Opposition	from	village	councils	
because	of	loss	of	influence	and	
resources	to	the	county	level.
Disputes	will	continue	between	
existing	county	seats	and	county-
level	cities.
Duplication	of	powers:	similar	
public	services	will	be	provided	in	
cities	by	government	bodies	and	
in	rural	areas	apparently	by	local	
state	authorities.	This	will	also	
need	more	complicated	Budget	
procedures	and	more	complicated	
laws.
Option 2: Concentrate 
administration at the 
county level
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Option	3.	 Enlargement	through	voluntary		
	 	 mergers	of	communities	and		
	 	 a	redistribution	of	functions		
	 	 on	a	contractual	basis
This option avoids some of the disadvantages of the pre-
vious option and takes care of an important political is-
sue that can arise in implementing Option 2: the transfer 
of functions to the county level can potentially provoke 
conflict between the existing county seat and county-
level cities that have a well-developed local government 
and strong financial base. Such cities consider them-
selves self-sufficient, prefer to be independent of county 
seats, and have a direct link to the State Budget.
Pros Cons
Strengthening	the	government	
of	certain	village	councils	
would	enable	them	to	provide	
more	public	services	at	a	level	
closer	to	their	residents—that	
part	provided	on	the	county	
level	today	or	not	provided	at	
all—and	to	improve	overall	
service	quality.
The	conditions	can	be	estab-
lished	to	strengthen	participa-
tion	of	community	members	
in	solving	local	issues	through	
public	discussion	of	voluntari-
ly	joining	forces	on	a	contrac-
tual	basis.
The	passivity	of	current	
rural	communities,	lack	of	
qualified	workers	in	small	
communities	that	need	to	be	
enlarged	could	result	in	an	
overly	slow	process	of	merg-
ers	on	a	contractual	basis.
Poor	legislation	regulating	
voluntary	contractual	rela-
tions	among	public	bodies	
could	lead	to	conflicts	that	
even	the	courts	will	not	be	
able	to	settle	effectively.
The drawbacks of this option can be largely reduced by 
introducing proper fiscal incentives for voluntary merg-
ers, such as through the allocation of state funds for in-
frastructure development.
Option 3: Communities 
merge voluntarily
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Option	.	 Enlarging	communities	through		
	 	 centralized	mergers,	including		
	 	 compulsory	ones
The main threat facing this option is opposition from 
both voters and local governments in rural areas in in-
stances of compulsory reform.
The advantage of this option over the previous one is the 
establishment of conditions for equal service standards 
throughout the country, across all communities and ter-
ritories.
Because the lowest level becomes self-sufficient, it 
should be able to provide a full range of better quality 
public services.
Pros Cons
The	basis	is	set	for	making	
community	governments	
better	capable	of	providing	
more	public	services	closer	
to	their	residents	(that	part	
provided	on	the	county	
level	or	not	provided	at	
all)	and	improving	overall	
service	quality.
The	material	and	financial	
bases	of	local	governments	
are	reinforced.
The	ability	of	local	govern-
ments	to	provide	public	
services	becomes	consis-
tent	across	the	country.
Rural	communities	and	gov-
ernments	will	oppose	forced	
mergers.
Conflicts	could	arise	in	some	
centralized	communities.
This fourth option can also be implemented in tandem 
with Option 3 as the final stage of local government re-
form.
Along with community enlargement, the issue of county 
enlargement can be tackled.
Option 4: Forced 
consolidation will 
raise hackles
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The most heated debates with representatives of lo­
cal community were around administrative­territo­
rial reform as one of main elements of local govern­
ment reform. The regions remember the failed efforts 
headed by Vice Premier for Territorial Reform Ro­
man Bezsmertniy in 2005 and are quite cautious 
about new ideas along those lines.
Stakeholders appeared convinced that in changing 
the borders of administrative­territorial units it was 
important to be guided not by “scientifically viable 
minimal population” numbers for each level of 
ATU—the basic principle espoused by the NU–NS 
and BYT coalition—but by specific regional socio­
political and economic characteristics.
A good example is Chernivtsi Oblast, which has 
many tiny communities. Those from Bukovyna be­
lieve that it is unlikely that neighboring villages dif­
fering as to language, religion and ethnicity will want 
to merge into a single community, because such 
mergers could make the situation worse and lead to 
open conflicts.
Participating stakeholders supported only the idea of 
greater consolidation of the weakest communities at 
the lowest level—villages—into larger ATUs. Other 
proposed enlargements, at the county or oblast level, 
received very negative reactions. The main argu­
ment against was the increased distance between the 
public and their service providers.
It becomes obvious that administrative­territorial 
reform needs to offer positive incentives. Currently, 
stakeholders think that undeveloped road and trans­
port infrastructure and the low penetration of cars 
make distances to oblast centers or county seats 
where administrative or social services are provided 
a very important factor. Enlarging counties or oblasts 
seems little more than an ill­thought out project by 
Kyiv politicians rather than an urgent need.
Such reform needs 
to reflect regional 
differences
Stakeholders were 
against county- 
 or oblast-level 
mergers
Stakeholders are wary 
of administrative 
reform
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The main conclusion of project experts was that 
large­scale administrative–territorial reform is im­
possible in Ukraine for a number of objective and 
subjective reasons. Still, a move to merge feeble 
ATUs at the lowest level—villages and small towns—
that is not done in a mechanistic way but takes into 
account regional peculiarities is probably realistic.
3.2.	 A	clear	distribution	of	powers		
among	all	levels	of	government
The overlap and duplication of powers among local gov-
ernments and local state administrations needs to be 
eliminated.
By setting up executive bodies for county and oblast 
councils that will focus solely on governing functions, it 
will be possible to depoliticize the councils themselves 
and task them with handling the development of their 
communities, a typical local government job. It will also 
improve the quality of public services, as county govern-
ments will be more dependent on county residents.
The nature of local state administrations needs to change. 
By being relieved of their economic functions, they will 
be in a position to monitor the compliance of local gov-
ernments with the law and public service standards. In 
this case, the existence of state administrations at the 
county level seems pointless.
There also needs to be a fixed set of public tasks that each 
level of government will be responsible for by law, that is, 
through a new law “On local government” or two new 
laws: “On community government” and “On county 
government”. At each level, the delegated powers must 
be exclusive.
Local administrations 
should oversee the 
enforcement of 
legislation
Broad-based 
administrative reform 
is impossible
Executive organs are 
needed at the county 
and oblast level
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Proposed list of community powers
If the communities are enlarged to capacity level, the 
idea is to delegate these tasks to them:
pre­school education and upbringing;
secondary education and extracurricular activi­
ties;
care of the elderly and disabled;
preventive and primary medicine;
land management;
environment protection;
housing construction planning;
municipal and residential utilities (water supply 
network, sewage, heating, power and energy con­
servation);
landscaping, maintenance of local roads, streets, 
parks, cemeteries, and so on;
local transportation;
organization of recreation and cultural activities 
(clubs, libraries);
health and sanitation;
veterinary control and prevention.
Those powers that can not be exercised by communi­
ties should be delegated to the county level and those 
that can not be exercised at the county level should 
be delegated to the oblast.
Participating stakeholders mostly agreed that it was 
necessary to eliminate the duplication of powers be­
tween the state authorities and local governments 
and between different levels of local government. 
One proposition was that there be a comprehensive 
list of the powers delegated to local governments of 
each level and to state authorities written into law.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The powers of local 
governments at all 
levels should be 
specified in law
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No effective solution was proposed for legislating the 
limits of local government powers within a single ad­
ministrative­territorial unit. It may be that this will 
be impossible to do without introducing changes to 
the administrative­territorial system.
3.3.	 Fiscal	independence		
for	local	government
3.3.1.	 Providing	a	sufficient	fiscal	base		
for	local	government
First, the local tax system needs reforming, namely by 
introducing a property or real estate tax and reforming 
the existing land tax. There is the risk that such a step 
will be unpopular, so any move will need an effective in-
formation and promotion campaign. Property tax could 
be mitigated during the introductory phase by establish-
ing a simplified mechanism for calculating it and mod-
estly low rates.
Second, the majority of state taxes need to be earmarked 
for local government use. This should spur local govern-
ments to expand their tax bases. One negative conse-
quence of such a decision could be even greater regional 
discrepancies as to the quality and accessibility of public 
services. Financially independent regions will be able to 
provide better quality services, while underdeveloped re-
gions will not be able to match them. This calls for effec-
tive mechanisms to ensure financial leveling and leveling 
transfers are likely to be larger.
Third, mechanisms are needed that will motivate the 
state tax service to collect local taxes and duties, possibly 
by instituting of dual accountability on the part of the 
heads of local tax offices.
In discussing the prospects for a real estate tax and 
an improved land tax, participating stakeholders 
agreed that both were needed. They did express some 
reservations as to the timeframes involved and were 
Most state taxes 
should be designated 
for local budgets
A property tax and a 
reformed land tax are 
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not all certain whether these taxes could fill local 
budgets.
In the first place, as Dnipropetrovsk Oblast adminis­
tration representatives stated, before even introduc­
ing a property tax it would be necessary to carry out 
a feasibility study, to determine what kind of revenue 
volumes it might bring and it would match the even­
tual cost of administrating it. This could be vital for 
certain disadvantaged territories, given the need to 
reduce the tax rate for property providing less than 
the norm of space per resident and property belong­
ing to poor people.
Spacious properties that would be subject to the high­
est tax rate tend to be distributed unevenly, mostly in 
communities in close to large cities. This is why in­
troducing a property tax in more remote communi­
ties will not have the necessary impact on their bud­
gets.
The question of reforming the land tax was also hot­
ly debated. According to some of the ideas voiced, 
this reform needs to be combined with a more active 
institution of an agricultural land market. Currently, 
land offers few serious revenues. In more remote 
residential areas, arable farmland is often left un­
cultivated. Having a land tax when land is not being 
worked or is being poorly used is pointless.
One factor that might make the land tax more bene­
ficial according to some participating stakeholders 
would be to transfer land adjacent to residential ar­
eas to the local community’s jurisdiction and to ex­
tend the principle of universal local government 
throughout Ukraine. In addition, there were propos­
als to provide local governments with the power to 
monitor whether farmland locate on their territory is 
bringing its owners any income.
Impact analysis 
is needed before 
instituting new taxes
Without a land 
market, a land tax 
won’t work
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3.3.2.	 Enforcing	state	and	local	government		
fiscal	obligations
To solve this problem, a workable mechanism needs to 
be developed and enshrined in law to allow local govern-
ments to refuse to take on functions that are not funded 
fully by the State Budget and one that would allow them 
to forcibly draw on funds from the State Budgets in situ-
ations where tax breaks introduced in Kyiv result in low-
er revenues at the local level.
Gradually, certain delegated powers should become lo-
cal and be funded from local sources of local budget rev-
enues.
At the same time, the central government and the Verk-
hovna Rada should refrain from impinging on areas of 
local government authority, especially by offering breaks 
on local taxes and fees.
One solution of this problem could be to settle disputes 
between local governments and local state administra-
tions through the courts. Participating stakeholders re-
peatedly emphasized the need for closer ties between 
local government reform and judiciary reform.
3.3.3	 Establishing	public	service	standards		
and	means	to	assess	their	cost
The standards for administrative and public services 
need to be updated and brought into line with modern 
requirements. These upgraded standards should be ac-
cessible both to service beneficiaries and service provid-
ers, and become the basis for:
forming a budget for the entity that is the service pro-
vider;
calculating interbudgetary transfers;
effectively controlling expenditures and assessing 
service quality.
•
•
•
Local governments 
should not take on 
functions that are not 
funded
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There were varying proposals to introduce public 
service standards from stakeholders. First of all, they 
said that developing such standards and, even more 
so, instituting them at the regional level would re­
quire considerable resources to be earmarked in the 
State Budget. To ensure a successful introduction, it 
would also be necessary to train local officials to ap­
ply these standards. Otherwise, they would remain 
on paper only.
Stakeholders were also concerned about the possi­
bility that the positions of local governments in dif­
ferent regions might be ignored while the central gov­
ernment developed the standards and the methods 
for calculating their cost. Participants emphasized 
repeatedly that, if local governments were not in­
volved in the process, the ultimate standards and the 
assessment of their cost would either be largely ig­
nored or would cause many regional distortions. 
Overly high and idealistic standards devised by the 
central government could lead to a situation where 
few communities could actually meet those stan­
dards. The calculation methodology also needs to be 
flexible to reflect the difference in the cost of goods 
and services in different regions.
3..	 Effective	use	of	funds,	assets		
and	other	resources
3.4.1.	Effective	use	of	funds
The ineffective and inappropriate use of public funds 
can be resolved through budget reform whose key com-
ponent is decentralizing public finance. Four main steps 
are necessary to achieve this:
standing legislation should be reviewed and obliga-
tions that can be funded neither by the state nor by 
local governments need to be tossed;
workable procedures are needed for merging com-
munities and co-financing certain public service 
•
•
These standards 
should be developed in 
partnership with local 
representatives
Developing service 
standards goes hand-
in-hand with training 
in instituting them
Budget reform is 
needed
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functions, especially the possibility of financing of a 
single institution from different budgets on contrac-
tual basis;
a system of overseeing and monitoring the effective-
ness and efficiency of budget expenditures is needed, 
including planned audits. In particular, some way of 
introducing management by objectives needs to be 
considered for budget planning and establishing in-
dependent public institutions that can monitor the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of local budget use and 
conduct regular audits.
the network of publicly-funded institutions needs to 
be optimized if public money is to be spent more ef-
fectively.
Participating stakeholders focused most on the need 
to monitor public spending. They said that the main 
emphasis must shift to getting community, media and 
local activists more involved in this process. NGOs, 
which view independent public monitoring as one of 
the main ways to make the use of public funds effec­
tive, were especially vocal during the discussion of 
this issue.
The project experts were given information about a 
number of pilot projects taking place in this sphere, 
including efforts to monitor public funds launched by 
a coalition of NGOs in Dnipropetrovsk. To increase 
the effectiveness of their local government, this co­
alition is working to introduce public policy mecha­
nisms: open debates of important local decisions with 
all stakeholders and a search for consensual solu­
tions. This kind of work needs to be extended to oth­
er regions.
•
•
Public monitoring of 
public spending is the 
key to effective use of 
resources
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3.4.2.	 Effective	management	and	intended	use		
of	community	property
The status of community property needs to be regulated 
by law. In addition, the allocation and registration of 
municipal and state lands needs to be completed. Final-
ly, there has to be effective, independent public control 
over how legitimately and appropriately community as-
sets and property are managed  and land issues are hand-
led.
Participating stakeholders considered it necessary to 
restrict the opportunities local government officials 
have to bargain away community property. One par­
ticular idea voiced was to legislate a ban on the free 
transfer of subsistence plots to individuals by local 
governments, as this provision offered many oppor­
tunities for corruption.
In addition, stakeholders proposed involving local 
communities in overseeing state management of re­
sources and property in a variety of ways. Their pri­
ority was forest, water and land resources. The ma­
jority of speakers stressed that public management of 
these resources was very poor because they mostly 
function as cash cows for those officials who manage 
them and for private business. One original idea 
brought up was that natural resources should be di­
vided into two categories: strategic resources, whose 
management should be left with the central govern­
ment, and local resources, such as granite, sand and 
so on, whose development should profit local com­
munities.
Mineral, forest and 
water management 
are all ineffective
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3..	 Local	government	participation		
in	making	state	policy
Any drafts of legislation that affects local interests need 
to be coordinated or debated, at the central level, with 
national associations of local governments and, at the 
local level, with the government of the relevant level. 
This coordination and consultation should be made 
mandatory by law.
According to a statement by the Association of Cities of 
Ukraine, mechanisms for cooperation between the As-
sociation and the Verkhovna Rada have already been de-
veloped and implemented. However, cooperation be-
tween the Association and the Cabinet of Ministers 
needs improvement.
Proposals from stakeholders on how to resolve this 
problem were diverse. Some stakeholders insisted 
that, to reflect the interests of local government more 
fully, a bicameral legislature is needed to form state 
policy, with the upper chamber being formed of rep­
resentatives of local government and would be able 
to control and restrict the legislative initiatives of the 
lower chamber.
In addition, some said that, to solve this problem, 
local governments and their associations needed to 
lobby more. Only pressure from below was likely to 
put local government reform on the central govern­
ment’s agenda and make it pay attention to local 
communities. Another option was to get local party 
activists to unite to lobby necessary changes in their 
parties’ policies towards local government.
It became clear during the consultations that such 
lobbying groups would not be equally active in all re­
gions of Ukraine. For example, in Lutsk and Cher­
nivtsi political party representatives expressed readi­
ness to take on more power and more responsibility. 
Local politicians saw local government as the place 
for their professional activity and thus viewed its re­
There’s no mechanism 
for local governments 
to interact with the 
Government
An upper chamber 
of parliament could 
represent local 
government interests
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form as an opportunity to expand their sphere of in­
fluence.
On the other hand, stakeholders from other regions, 
such as Dnipropetrovsk, expressed strong doubts that 
local deputies would welcome reforms that would in­
crease their powers and responsibilities. In their 
opinion, political parties in these regions were im­
mature and the interests of local deputies were lim­
ited to land allotment, which they tended lobby for 
their own benefit under the current system. Needless 
to say, these deputies care little about reform. Even if 
their powers were increased, they would be at a loss 
as what to do with them and the quality of local ser­
vices in such regions would not improve as a result of 
reform.
3..	 Stronger	human	resources		
for	the	local	public	sector
Like the civil service, service in local governments needs 
to be professional and apolitical.
In particular, there needs to be real competition for jobs 
and career promotions and it must become impossible to 
dismiss municipal officials for political reasons and oth-
er subjective factors. Most importantly, political and ad-
ministrative positions in local governments need to be 
clearly distinguished. Salaries for municipal officials 
need to be in sync with salaries in the private sector, in 
addition to being transparent.
Once county state administrations are eliminated, it will 
make sense to encourage those officials to switch over to 
local governments, especially, to the executive commit-
tees of county councils.
It is especially important for local governments to insti-
tute mandatory continuing professional development 
for officials.
The enlargement of communities is likely to have posi-
tive impact on the quality of human resources for the 
Administrative and 
political and positions 
must be distinguished 
at the local level
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local public sector, as it will increase competition for 
jobs in this sector and will provide more opportunities 
for competent people to develop careers.
Participating stakeholders thought that this problem 
was one the most essential. It was mentioned in al­
most every region where consultations took place. 
Stakeholders were adamant that there needed to be 
a system of continuing professional development for 
local government representatives and professional 
training for local council deputies.
In discussing the need for municipal officials to con­
tinue to develop professionally, stakeholders noted 
that professionalism needed to become one criterion 
in performance appraisals and career promotions for 
officials. Only under such conditions would these in­
dividuals be motivated to continue their professional 
development. If professional development fails to be­
come one of the criteria against which a municipal 
official’s performance is measured, the municipal 
officials will have little incentive to attend profes­
sional development programs.
Although the professional development of deputies 
should, logically, be a matter of concern to the lead­
ership of local parties, the latter lack the capacity to 
undertake it. So, this issue needs to be the focus of 
attention for international donors who are working 
on local government development, and possibly state 
government.
Stakeholders discussed mechanisms for resolving 
this problem, such as training local deputies at State 
Budget cost in return for registering them in the Civil 
Service reserve.
Also, Zhytomyr Oblast representatives reported on 
the status of a pilot project for training local govern­
ment officials. This is being conducted by the Main 
Civil Service Administration and the oblast council. 
Unfortunately, this project remains a pilot at this 
time.
Both the state and 
donors need to focus 
on training local 
deputies
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One radical proposal was to include specific educa­
tion requirements for those running for local councils 
and the mayor’s office in electoral legislation.
3..	 A	different	system	of	council	elections
Local governments need to represent the interests of 
their electorate, that is, the residents of their community, 
county or oblast. This means that Ukraine probably 
needs to go back to the majority electoral system in cities 
and switch to a proportional system with open lists at all 
other levels.
With a majoritarian system of elections, elections to 
county and oblast councils could take place at polling 
districts whose borders coincide with the boundaries of 
territories to be represented on the given council. In 
counties, this means community boundaries; in oblasts, 
it means counties and oblast-level cities. This should en-
sure proper representation of the common interests of 
county and oblast communities.
Moreover, local and national elections should be held at 
different times, which would enable voters to devote 
more time and attention to local elections.
For councils to be able to represent the interests of local 
communities, a provision could be introduced accord-
ing to which only residents of the relevant city, county or 
oblast would be eligible to run for office at that level.
The lack of professionalism among local deputies, as 
participating stakeholders saw it, was a direct result 
of the change in the electoral system. The closed pro­
portional system was much criticized by participants. 
They said that, although the new election system had 
some positive effects in terms of the development of 
political parties at the local level, local representa­
tive bodies also worked less effectively as a result.
However, stakeholders were unable to find a reason­
able and consistent answer to how the system should 
be changed. Some proposed going back to the majo­
The closed 
proportional system 
 is ineffective
Educational 
requirements for local 
deputies could be set 
in law
Stakeholders did not 
agree about the best 
electoral system
	 
rity system and shifting to a proportional model with 
some type of open lists. The discussion also led to the 
conclusion that analytical and consultative work was 
needed with stakeholders at the local level so that 
they could make up their own mind about which 
electoral system was better for them and start lobby­
ing for it in Kyiv.
3..	 Public	participation	in	decision-making	
and	overseeing	government
Mechanisms are needed that will make it possible for the 
public to participate in the making of important local 
decisions. A law on local referenda needs to be adopted. 
To improve the quality of administrative services, such 
services need to be decentralized and delegated to the 
local government.
Participating stakeholders actively proposed other 
changes that might allow for more effective commu­
nity oversight of local government. Among these was 
improving the mechanism for removing local depu­
ties from office, giving this right to voters, rather than 
a party’s executive. Another suggestion was to estab­
lish a stricter approach to the responsibility of state 
administrators if local councils voted non­confi­
dence in them and stricter accountability on the part 
of elected representatives under law.
Stakeholders placed considerable hope on such in­
struments as public councils and hearings as a way 
to oversee government. However, to make these more 
effective, provisions on public hearings need to be 
both more simple and more mandatory for local gov­
ernments in clearly specified instances. At the mo­
ment, most community statutes simply state that such 
hearings “can be held.” Also, the level of representa­
tion of stakeholders needs to be clearer, because such 
hearings are currently not very representative. Both 
these instruments can be written into the statutes of 
all local communities.
The mechanism for 
recalling deputies 
needs improvement
A law on local 
referenda is needed
Provisions on public 
hearings also need 
improvement
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Another problem with public oversight is lack of ca­
pacity among community organizations to represent 
their own interests at council meetings or hearings, 
even when local governments are open to the idea. A 
good example is Mykolayiv: stakeholders from the 
local government reported that community represen­
tatives on the permanent advisory committee at­
tached to the deputy commission on local govern­
ment were quite inactive. Capacity­building among 
such local organizations should be the focus of efforts 
among both officials and international donors.
3..	 More	consistent	state	policy	
countrywide
Local state administrations need to be depoliticized. 
The posts of local state administrators should be includ-
ed in the list of civil service postings and politically neu-
tral professionals should be appointed to those positions. 
As these individuals will not perform any governing 
functions, they should not be answerable to the local 
councils.
The law also has to establish personal responsibility for 
local government officials, including locally elected 
deputies, for decisions that are in violation of the law.
According to participating stakeholders, this problem 
could be partly resolved through judiciary reform. In 
addition, they agreed that local administrations 
could be more effective at ensuring consolidated state 
policy if they were relieved of all local government 
functions and left with only such functions as over­
seeing local government compliance with the law 
and with standards of public services.
The post of head of 
state administration 
must be depoliticized
The capacity of local 
CSOs to monitor and 
oversee government 
must be raised
Judiciary reform is 
imperative
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3.10.	 Local	government	reform	that	is	clear,	
	 reasonable	and	consistent
Regional government, that is, executive bodies for oblast 
councils and the transformation of local state adminis-
trations into coordinating and supervisory bodies over-
seeing the legitimacy of the work of local governments, 
needs to be instituted in Ukraine. However, if it is intro-
duced before there is proper local government, it could 
lead to a certain imbalance in the political structure if 
reform is implemented simultaneously at all levels. 
Moreover, there is a risk that political power will then 
concentrate at the oblast level, hindering full decentrali-
zation and the development of meaningful local govern-
ment.
Moreover, to avoid conflict between oblasts and their 
centers, one proposal is to assign the status of “urban 
region” to some of the country’s largest cities and pro-
viding them with the functions and powers at both local 
and oblast levels.
suggested steps for reform
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Annex	1.	Decentralization	
and	transparency:	
local	government	
reform	in	Hungary
The relationship between central and local government 
is changing. The idea of decentralization is now accept-
ed as the way forward in many countries worldwide. 
Moreover, there are many different reasons for introduc-
ing a decentralized system. 
The introduction of pluralistic democratic government 
at the national level led in almost all CEE countries to an 
immediate demand for parallel reform in local adminis-
tration. What varied greatly, however, was the speed with 
which these elected bodies were vested with the powers 
and resources that determined their real weight in local 
affairs.
Three sets of issues typically posed challenges:
territorial structure;
assignment of competencies;
funding.
•
•
•
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The	size	of	administrative	units	and	options		
for	reforming	local	government
The European Union introduced a common classifica-
tion of territorial units, called the NUTS system. Why is 
this NUTS system important for decentralization and 
Member States? For one thing, NUTS levels are used 
for allocating structural funds as the classification sys-
tem is hierarchical. Member States may decide to go 
further still in terms of hierarchical levels by subdividing 
to NUTS Level 3. The NUTS level to which an admin-
istrative unit belongs is determined on the basis of popu-
lation thresholds shown in the Table 1.
Table	1.	 Territorial	Structure:		
	 	 Territorial	Units	in	the	EU
Level Minimum	popula-tion
Maximum	popula-
tion
NUTS	1 3,000,000 ,000,000
NUTS	2 00,000 3,000,000
NUTS	3 10,000 00,000
It is interesting to compare the administrative figures 
and the NUTS II figures of the new member states. 
Here, we can see that, of the 10 countries shown, only 
three have adopted the regional decentralization model. 
The NUTS system is 
used to distribute EU 
structural funds
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Table	2.	 Territorial	Structure:	Higher	Levels
Country
Number	
of	NUTS	II	
Units
Number	of	In-
termediate	or	
Upper	Levels	of	
Government
Type	of	Regiona-
lization
Bulgaria  2 Administrative	Regionalization
Chech	
Repupblic  1
Regional	Decen-
tralization
Estonia 1 1 Administrative	Regionalization
Hungary 
1	counties	+	
22	cities	with	
county	status	
+	Budapest
Administrative	
Regionalization	
+	Regionaliza-
tion	by	Existing	
Local	Govern-
ment
Latvia 1
2	districts	
with	rights	+	
local	govern-
ments
	cities	with	
district	rights
Regionalization	
by	Existing	Local	
Governments
Lithuania 1 10 Administrative	Regionalization
Poland 1 1 Regional	Decen-tralization
Romania  1	+	Bucha-rest
Regionalization	
by	Existing	Local	
Governments
Slovenia 1  Administrative	Regionalization
Slovakia   Regional	Decen-tralization
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The question is: Would it be relevant to base a new gov-
ernment tier on the NUTS II level? In the countries 
without a decentralization model, the NUTS II level 
could be considered a possible framework for regional 
development planning. In Hungary, the Regional Devel-
opment Act provided for the formation of regional coun-
cils called macro-region development councils in each 
NUTS II unit, with decision-making powers for the im-
plementation of regional policy. However, these regional 
councils are not a new tier of government, but rather an 
assembly of representatives of institutions involved in re-
gional development. 
Table 2 shows that there is generally a clear-cut divide 
between the approach to regional development and the 
approach to territorial administrative division of the 
country. Poland is the only country among 10 in which 
the country’s regional divisions and the NUTS II level 
coincide. This reflects the fact observed in EU member 
states that territorial reform is not only a response to new 
problems, but also a result of history, of existing legal 
systems and patterns of institutions, and, last but not 
least, of party politics.
In the majority of CEE countries, local government legis-
lation has allowed human settlements of any size to 
claim the status of an autonomous municipality. The re-
sult is that the basic level of local government has a high-
ly fragmented territorial structure, as illustrated in Ta-
ble 3.
The NUTS-2 level is 
for planning regional 
development
The administrative 
territorial structure 
of EU countries does 
not match the NUTS 
system
Local government is 
very fragmented in 
CEE countries
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Table	3.	 Number	of	municipalities		
	 	 and	their	population	in	CEE	countries
Country
Number	
of	Mu-
nicipali-
ties
Mean	
Population	
of	Munici-
palities
%	of	Mu-
nicipali-
ties	with	
Less	Then	
1,000	
Inhabit-
ants
%	of	Popula-
tion	Living	
in	Munici-
palities	with	
Less	then	
1,000	Inhab-
itants
Estonia 2 ,13 . 1.2
Latvia 3 ,00 32.1 .
Lithu-
ania  ,300 1. 0
Poland 2,3 1,1 0 0
Czech	
Republic ,230 1, . 1.
Slovakia 2, 1, . 1.2
Hungary 3,12 3,22 . .
Slovenia 12 10,3 3.1 0.2
The target minimum in Western European reorganiza-
tion at the basic levels of local government has average 
population sizes well over 5,000, which has been and is 
viewed empirically as adequate for most municipal ser-
vices. However, most CEE countries have thousands of 
communities claiming municipal status with popula-
tions below 1,000—and a substantial proportion of these 
fewer than 200. Reform programs are challenged by the 
inability of such communities to provide administrative 
and fiscal capacity.
There is a range of solutions to territorial fragmentation, 
including amalgamation of smaller units, performance 
of tasks through inter-municipal bodies, and assignment 
of selected tasks to either central municipalities or to 
higher tiers of government. Local government associa-
tions resist the compulsory frameworks that usually ac-
company inter-municipal cooperation on any signifi-
cant scale. Assigning tasks to central towns is unpopular 
with villages, and assigning them to higher tiers is un-
popular with the larger towns. 
Efforts to consolidate 
communities run into 
political opposition
Municipalities must 
have at least 5,000 
residents
	 
The	system	for	managing	development		
at	the	regional	level
Similarly to the practice of other countries, the spatial 
and settlement structure of Hungary is laid down in its 
Constitution. Accordingly, the total national area is di-
vided into the capital, counties, towns and villages. In 
Hungary after the change, the Constitution and the Act 
on Local Governments recognized those rights of local 
communities, including the smallest of settlements to 
govern their own local affairs. As a consequence, the 
number of local units jumped from 1,500 to 3,152.
The passing or amendment of acts concerning the local 
government requires a two-thirds majority in the Parlia-
ment. This qualified majority requirement is intended as 
a safeguard, but it can occasionally generate tensions 
and even hold back opportunities to introduce change. 
This is particularly the case in Hungary at present where, 
following the recent local elections, the opposition has a 
majority in most local governments.
Local government in Hungary exists at two levels: the 
municipality and the county. There is no hierarchical re-
lationship between the two levels. County governments 
are neither superior organs to municipal governments, 
nor do they have any supervisory authority over them. 
The difference between these two lies in the administra-
tive tasks delegated to them. Municipalities provide lo-
cal public services to their settlements; counties have a 
subsidiary role in that they provide public services that 
settlements cannot undertake, as well as those that have 
a territorial character. 
In the European Union, regional level units have a dual 
function: to develop underdeveloped regions; and to 
mediate between central and local public administrative 
responsibilities, organize regional services, and reduce 
differences among local geographical units. 
In Hungary, seven 7 planning and statistical regions have 
been set up, corresponding to the NUTS system. In each 
region, a council will be formed of representatives of mi-
cro-regions, mayors of big towns, representatives of eco-
Hungary’s options for 
changing its territorial 
administration are 
complicated
At the NUTS-2 
level, Hungary 
has established 7 
development regions
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nomic and social partners, and representatives of rele-
vant ministries. The Council’s main tasks include the 
formulation and adoption of a regional development 
concept and programs, the coordination of territorial 
economic development, the preparation financial plans, 
and policy on decentralized development sources.
Hungary will not necessarily have to establish self-gov-
erning assemblies in the regions either, but this can be 
one objective in the process of constitutional amend-
ment, and the present regional development institution-
al system may provide the regional basis for the program-
ming and the allocation of government funds. 
Hungary’s	micro-regions	and	local	taxes
The reason for the establishing the micro-region system 
in 2004 was firstly to develop more structured joint pro-
vision in key areas of public spending, including devel-
opment projects. The central government is encouraging 
municipalities to use the micro-regions as a basis for 
such joint provision. Several incentive mechanisms have 
been introduced, such as progressively larger grants, 
threshold requirements in investment grants, and one-
off and formula-based compensations. As of 2007, some 
penalties have also been introduced. For example, the 
“deficit grant” will no longer be available to those mu-
nicipalities that are not in an association for the joint 
provision of educational services.
Virtually all the micro-regions are now being used for 
joint provision and are running at least three services. 
The most common joint provision as Table 4 shows is in 
education. Though the micro-region system seems to be 
running well, there is some scope for improving gover-
nance. The micro-regions are typically run by the asso-
ciation councils comprising only the mayors from par-
ticipating municipalities. Reportedly, in some instances 
this is leading to excessive marginalization of municipal 
assemblies. 
Micro-regions are 
municipal unions that 
provide public services
Administrative bodies 
at this level do not 
have the status 
 of local governments
Almost all micro-
regions provide 
common educational 
services
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Table	4.	 System	of	Micro-Regions	in	Hungary
Purposes
Number	of	Micro-	
Regions	with	Joint	
Provisions
In	%
Education 12 
Social	Institutions 21 13
Basic	Social	Services 113 
Children-Protections	
Services 2 1
Basic	Children-Welfare	
Services 13 2
Mobile	Libraries  
Internal	Audit 12 2
Total	Number	of	Micro-
Regions	with	Joint	
Provisions
1 	
The total fiscal capacity of municipalities is basically de-
termined by
exclusive revenues from local taxes, local fees and 
user charges, 
municipal surcharge on shared taxes, mostly on per-
sonal and corporate income,
revenues from the sale or rental of municipal prop-
erty, 
bond fees, bank credits and other interest income, 
income from municipal companies, and 
general and special subsidies and grants of the central 
government, and so on.
The ability of municipalities to mobilize their own fiscal 
resources is generally judged quite limited, partly be-
cause relevant decisions on local tax bases and rates as 
well as tax sharing schedules have been made by the cen-
tral government and/or are subject to serious restrictions 
in the national tax law. Although the intergovernmental 
  As of February 2007.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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transfer system is constructed differently from one coun-
try to another, the dominance of a purpose- and project-
oriented grant system is apparent. 
In Hungary, under the current legal framework, local 
authorities have a relatively wide margin of discretion 
about how to from their local taxes. The heaviest local 
tax is the business tax. But there are problems with it:
It erodes the local tax base and increases pressure on 
tax competition.
To the extent that regional disparity in the local busi-
ness tax base broadly matches that of wealth, strong 
reliance on local business taxes aggravates regional 
income disparities.
At present Budapest and surrounding municipalities 
collect the most local business tax and, indeed, four dis-
tricts within Budapest alone account for 30% of total 
business tax revenues.
Table	5.	 Local	Taxes	in	Hungary	As	of	2005
Type	of	Tax
Number	of	
Munici-
palities	
Levyig	the	
Tax
Number	of	
Municipalities	
Levying	The	
Tax	as	a	%	of	
Total	Number	of	
Municipalities	
Levying	at	Least	
One	Tax
Amount	of	
Revenues	
Raised	
As	a	%	of	
Total	Local	
Revenues
Building	tax 3 23, 11,2
Land	tax 02 12, 1,3
Communal	tax	
for	individuals 210 0, 2
Communal	tax	
for	business 02 22, 0,3
Tourism	tax 1 1, 1,3
Local	business	tax 23  
Total	number	of	
municipalities	
having	at	least	
one	tax
310 100 100
•
•
The largest local tax 
 in Hungary 
 is the business tax
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Acknowledging these problems, the government an-
nounced in 2005 that firms would be able to fully deduct 
local business taxes paid in calculating their corporate 
income tax in 2006 and that the local business tax would 
be completely eliminated in 2008. However, only the 
first step has been implemented so far, while the aboli-
tion of the local business tax has been suspended as part 
of the government’s measures to rein in its deficit.
The	structure	of	municipal	local	government	bodies
The basic rights and powers of local government are ex-
ercised by the body of representatives, which may dele-
gate authority to the mayor, and its committees. Dele-
gated powers may not be transferred further.
The decision to establish committees is determined by 
the representative body, which elects members to such 
committees. More than half a committee’s membership 
must be elected from among representatives, but the re-
maining members may be citizens or representatives of 
citizens’ organizations. Committees draft decisions and 
the representative body may grant committees decision-
making power, too.
The mayor is the political and administrative head of the 
local government and is responsible for local policy im-
plementation. The chief executive, also called the notary, 
is a public administration professional, while the mayor 
represents its political side. Thus, the chief executive is 
appointed, not elected, by the representative body for an 
undetermined period and on the basis of open competi-
tion. The law establishes the qualifications of chief ex-
ecutives.
The chief executive manages the office, is responsible for 
its day-to-day activities and is expected to ensure the 
lawful activities of the local government.
The main powers  
of local government 
belong  
to the representative 
body
The head  
of local government  
is the mayor
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Transparency	in	local	government		
and	community	oversight
Effective and efficient local government requires not 
only incentives from the central government but also 
strong oversight by local citizens. This can be helped by 
regulations ensuring transparency in the actions and 
outcomes of local government and by participation in 
decision-making.
Unfortunately, these are arguably inadequate in Hun-
gary. For example, regulations stipulate that at least one 
public hearing per year must be held. While virtually all 
municipalities comply, only a small fraction of them ex-
ceed this obligation. There are no strict rules for the or-
ganizing such public hearings, either, meaning that 
agendas can be set up in such a way as to avoid sensitive 
issues. Moreover, public hearings are often poorly adver-
tised and, as a result, poorly attended.
Local governments carry out a significant share of public 
procurement. Hungary scores fairly well in OECD indi-
cators for procurement policy and the latest report con-
cludes that most local public procurements follow the 
rules of open tendering procedures. However, it also 
points out that half of these local governments have yet 
to comply with the obligation to establish an internal 
code of conduct. Public procurement practices also fea-
ture among the complaints of foreign investors, along 
with other aspects of red tape and administrative proce-
dures.
Local	government	and	the	system	of	state	power	in	
Hungary
The creation of new local governments in 1990 required 
the transformation of the entire system of public admin-
istration. Before 1990, the state administered local af-
fairs in accordance with the principles of centralization 
and hierarchy through a system of councils at the local 
level. Since 1990, Hungarian public administration con-
sists of two main components: bureaucracy and demo-
cratic institutions. 
Public hearings 
 are not an effective 
instrument in Hungary
	 1
The first includes central government bodies and their 
organs at the local and territorial level (de-concentrated 
institutions), which are subordinate to the state admin-
istration. The second type of structure is the system of 
local governments (decentralized institutions), based on 
principles of autonomy and subsidiarity. The functions 
of public administration are shared by these two compo-
nents.
Wage-setting and employment conditions for public 
sector employees are strongly centralized. The central 
government imposes a limit on increases in the number 
of permanent employees and sets salary scales and wage 
adjustments. Local governments should be given more 
leeway in designing work contracts with their employees 
and in setting wage levels to reflect local conditions bet-
ter. The central government is moving ahead with re-
forms to remuneration and management for civil ser-
vants and similar systems are supposed to be adopted by 
local governments.
New European Union member states face significant 
challenges that require a strong public management sys-
tem:
the continuing challenges of fiscal management with 
many of the new member states not meeting the entry 
criteria for the euro zone on fiscal parameters, in-
cluding deficit levels;
new challenges of effective absorption and utilization 
of EU funding, which will amount to up to 3.5% of 
GDP in the next funding period;
the future challenge of remaining competitive inside 
and outside the EU.
A strongly performing public management system is an 
essential ingredient of sound fiscal management and ef-
fective development planning, both of which require 
well developed strategic planning and policy manage-
ment capacity and a stable and qualified human resource 
base.
•
•
•
Budapest  
is represented in  
the regions through 
the local offices  
of various ministries
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Decentralization is a complex and contentious process. 
It involves choices that are either politically or techni-
cally difficult—or both. It requires the reconciliation of 
conflicting interests. It demands tenacious spadework 
and, to drive the process through, determination and 
positive enthusiasm.
In the course of its systemic changes, Hungary faced 
historic challenges to establish a new type of local and 
central public administration and to form a government 
based on the results of democratic elections. Since 1996, 
Hungary has been addressing longer-term difficult is-
sues, such as policy implementation, as well as problems 
arising from the transition itself, such as  overly rapid de-
centralization in the early days of the reform process. By 
the end of 1999, the transitional challenges of building 
up basic legal and policy frameworks consistent with 
market democracy had been largely met. After 10 years 
of determined reform, Hungary has entered the main-
stream of the EU countries with respect to the challeng-
es it faces in establishing quality public administrative 
regimes supporting good governance and long-term 
economic growth.
